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Abstract
I analyze time-varying risk premia in long-term government securities during the
classical gold standard period 1870-1914.  I employ a quasi-capital asset pricing model
(CAPM) to analyze the time path of systematic risk for a cross section of six countries that
adhered to the gold standard to varying degrees.  The empirical results show that
systematic risk was higher and more variable for the countries that shadowed the gold
standard.  The results are consistent with recent research that the gold standard was a
signal of financial rectitude, "a good housekeeping seal of approval" (Bordo and Rockoff,
1996).  Peripheral countries then benefited by participating in a monetary union as
opposed to countries that pursue independent monetary policies.  Countries adhered to the
gold standard because they were able to obtain access to international capital markets at a
lower price.  In addition, there was a convergence of systematic risk for those countries
that belonged to a certain monetary union.  I also analyze the impact of the international
crisis of 1890, or any other perceived financial crisis.  Evidence indicates that there was a
'flight to quality' during the 1890's crisis.  Countries that did not adhere to the gold
standard generally experienced a larger increase in risk during the crisis period.  Finally,
the results indicate an overall decrease in the volatility of systematic risk during the early
1900s.  I interpret this as evidence of a 'market wide' effect on the international monetary
regime.
I.  Introduction
Economic and historical perspectives of the new Europe as it approaches the
millennium raise many questions about the proceeds that will be needed towards greater
integration among the member countries.  One of the main challenges of deepening and
widening the European Union is the economic and monetary system.  The monetary
authorities of all member countries look for a credible commitment to preserve the new
European coin, the EURO, at fixed parities.  However, peripheral countries of Europe can
look at the benefits and costs this new monetary rule can introduce in their economies.
Small countries, in the sense of being in the periphery, can benefit by participating in a
monetary union as opposed to countries that pursue independent monetary policies.
Comparisons of risk in interest rates for long-term securities for the European periphery
provide policy insights into the benefits and costs of being a "small" country that follows
or does not follow a certain monetary rule.  What sort of benefits do we expect by
adhering to a certain monetary regime?  This question has particular policy relevance for
the countries of the European periphery today.  It examines the potential benefits that can
accrue to small countries participating in the European Monetary Union.
Turning back the clock to the period 1880 to 1914, history has much to say about
these new European economic issues.  During the last years of the nineteenth century and
the beginning of the twentieth century, most of the countries of the world operated under
the same monetary regime, the classical gold standard.  The gold standard was dependent
on the specie flow mechanism where market forces stabilized exchange rates.  Countries
adhered to the international monetary rule to varying degrees.  Some of them were under
a monetary or currency union whereas others were pursuing independent monetary
policies.  Specifically, I examine risk premia in long term government bonds during
periods of convertibility and suspension for a cross section of six European countries that
followed the gold standard for the period 1880-1914.  I pay especially close attention to
the behavior of risk premia during the international crisis of 1890 as well as to any other
crisis, or perceived financial crisis, during this sample period.  I then take a depth look
into the relationship between adherence to the monetary rule and systematic risk during
crisis periods.  The purpose of this research is to provide then additional insight into the
operation of the gold standard, and the benefits that peripheral countries can gather by
adopting a predetermined monetary rule.  Not only economic historians but contemporary
policy makers in the European community of today can learn many lessons from a study
of systematic risk during the gold standard because of the large number of countries that
followed the gold standard (but to varying degrees) and the long 34 year time span.
Long run adherence to a monetary rule is a signal of financial rectitude that allows
countries to borrow at lower interest rates than they could otherwise in international
capital markets.  I examine the long-run benefits (and/or costs) of the gold standard by
analyzing systematic risk in interest rates in long-term government securities for a cross
section of countries during the classical gold standard period, 1880-1914.  The degree to
which countries adhered to the gold standard varied widely.  As a result there were
countries that strictly adhered to the gold standard, and countries that shadowed the gold
standard.  Comparisons within and between the countries that followed the rule -
Scandinavia - and the countries that shadowed it - the Southern European countries of
Italy, Portugal, and Spain - can provide new policy insights that contribute to the
development of the Europe of tomorrow.
The empirical analysis employs the Kalman filter to provide point (yearly)
estimates of systematic risk in a quasi-capital asset pricing model (CAPM).  The results
indicate that systematic risk was generally higher and more variable for countries that
shadowed or did not follow the gold standard.  This result is consistent with recent
research that the gold standard was a signal of financial rectitude, "a good housekeeping
seal of approval" (Bordo and Rockoff, 1996).  Countries adhered to the gold standard
because they obtained greater access to international capital markets at a lower price.
Moreover, the empirical evidence shows that there is convergence of risk for the countries
that belong to a certain monetary union (i.e., the Scandinavian Currency Union).  I also
find that systematic risk often fell for countries following the adoption of time-consistent
monetary and fiscal policies.  In addition, there appears to have been a 'flight to quality'
during the international financial crisis of 1890.  Countries that did not adhere to the gold
standard generally experienced a larger increase in risk during the crisis period.  The
increase in risk also tended to persist for the reminder of the 1890s for countries that did
not adhere to gold.  Finally, the results indicate an overall decrease in the volatility of
systematic risk during the first decade of the twentieth century.  This might reflect a fall
in the price of risk in general, a 'market wide' effect of the international monetary regime.
First I examine the gold standard as a credible commitment mechanism as well as
the record of adherence to the monetary rule for the countries used in the study.  Then I
analyze long-term interest rates and explain the econometrics approach.  This is followed
by a comparison of systematic risk's variability in each country.  The paper concludes by
noting the lessons that can be drawn from a study of the classical gold standard.
II.  A Credible Commitment Mechanism
The gold standard has been reinterpreted in the literature as a rule that ties the
hands of the fiscal and monetary authorities of a country.  The monetary rule is a credible
commitment mechanism that solves the time inconsistency problem.  Government policy
is said to be time inconsistent when a policy plan that is determined to be optimal and to
hold indefinitely into the future is subsequently revised.  For example, suppose that the
monetary authorities in a closed economy announce that their objectives are to maintain
full employment and zero inflation.  Under the assumption that the policy is credible,
rational agents will set wage contracts according to announced policy.  However, the
monetary authorities now have an incentive to cheat and print money to increase
seigniorage or to reduce unemployment.  If this occurs, then agents and firms will bid up
wages and prices in the following year.  Inflation will increase, real cash balances and the
inflation tax base will be reduced, and the economy will return to its original level of
activity and unemployment (Bordo and Rockoff, 1996).  On the other hand, policy that is
set sequentially is said to be discretionary.  Setting policy period by period can produce
very different results than the optimal outcome of a time-consistent policy.  Social welfare
is improved if there is a commitment mechanism that prevents the government from
changing future policies.  Therefore, it is beneficial for a government to have a credible
pre-commitment mechanism that ensures long-run price stability.
The gold standard functioned as the commitment mechanism for many countries
prior to World War I.  It was the perfect mechanism to avoid pressure over the balance of
payments, to satisfy the various objectives of the national monetary authority, and also to
provide price and exchange rate stability.  A stable exchange rate promoted international
transactions.  International trade and investment was undertaken with almost no risk to
capital losses due to the exchange rate fluctuations.  According to Eichengreen (1985), the
basic characteristics of the gold standard were: (i) convertibility between domestic money
and gold at a fixed official price; (ii) freedom for private citizens to export and import
gold; (iii) a set of rules relating the quantity of money in circulation in a country to their
gold stock.
These three features of the gold standard were applied for the years between 1870
and 1914.  Before this period the international monetary system was based on bimetallic
systems that switched between gold and silver.  The main feature of bimetallic regimes
was the ability to convert a national currency into a certain amount of gold or silver.  It
was a price stabilization system where the reserves of the two metals were used as a
protection against bankruptcy.  Money supplies in each country were associated with
domestic reserves.  The two precious metals and the adjustment of the balance of
payments was possible because of international shipments of gold and silver.
Both systems, the gold and bimetallic standards, served as commitment
mechanisms with a contingency plan.  Governments could stop specie payments during a
well understood emergency such as a war.  Suspension was used to print money for war
finance or to sell bonds at nominal value.  It was believed that following the end of the war
and a reasonable delay period, there would be a return to gold parity.  A government
would then impose the necessary deflationary policies to restore convertibility and redeem
liabilities in gold.
The escape clause could also be invoked if there was a financial crisis.  As pointed
out by Bordo and Rockoff (1996), suspension for a financial crisis was difficult to verify
and might have been perceived as a breach of the rule.  Other examples of discretion
would be a government's failure to return to convertibility following a reasonable delay
period after a war.  Consequently, a government might find it difficult to sell debt during
its next war.
The gold standard had enforcement mechanisms that might have prevented
authorities from using discretionary policies.  The international monetary regime was a
signal of financial rectitude that gave peripheral countries access to capital from the core
countries of the gold standard.  Countries that closely adhered to the monetary rule were
presumably charged lower interest rates than countries that frequently violated or did not
follow the commitment mechanism.  Although this paper focuses on risk premia in
government securities, the literature has also identified additional factors that might have
been important determinants of long term interest rates.  Earlier studies have attempted to
determine the role of pull factors (higher expected rates of return) and push factors (poor
investment prospects and higher savings rates) of long-term capital flows in the core
(Bordo and Rockoff, 1996).  In the spirit of Bordo and Rockoff, this paper assumes that
the key determinants of long-term capital flows are the expected real rates of return, the
levels of real activity, the terms of trade, and the phase of the business cycle.  I also believe
that adherence to the gold standard rule is an important determinant of the cost of capital.
Adherence often changed as a result of a change in government fiscal or monetary policy
(perhaps a breach of the gold standard), war, financial crisis, or perceived financial crisis.
Changes in these factors should be reflected in the market price of risk in long-term
government securities for the respective country.
III.  Historical Record of Adherence
The gold standard worked successfully as a contingent rule for the core countries
during the classical gold standard period:  Britain, France, and the United States.  A
number of other countries also followed the rule.  These included Australia, Canada,
Japan, the Netherlands, the Scandinavian countries, and Switzerland.  The last group is the
countries of Latin America and the Southern European countries for which gold
convertibility was the exception rather than the rule.  This paper compares systematic risk
on long-term securities during periods of convertibility and suspension for two groups of
European countries.  The first group contains countries that always followed the gold
standard, the Scandinavian countries of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden.  Finland is not
included in this sample because it was part of the Russian Empire during the period 1880-
1914.  In contrast, the second group of countries, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, did not adhere
to the international regime but shadowed the gold standard.  This sample was chosen on
the basis of adherence to the monetary rule in addition to data availability.
The gold standard experience of the three Scandinavian countries can be analyzed
as a whole just by looking at the development of the Scandinavian Currency Union which
was established during the first years of the 1870s.  Prior to the adoption of the gold
standard, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, operated under a silver standard.  In 1872, an
agreement to form a monetary union was signed.  Denmark and Sweden joined the Union
that year while Norway did it three years later, in 1875.   The Scandinavian Monetary
Union was based on gold and adopted a common unit, the krona, which circulated equally
in the three countries.  However, there was not a gold coin in circulation due to the public
preferences of using notes instead of gold.  The Swedish constitution guaranteed the
convertibility of central bank's notes into gold.  The three central banks agreed to allow
each other to draw drafts on each other at par.  All notes, gold coins, and token coins were
accepted at par in the other countries which allowed the Scandinavian Monetary Union to
be very successful.  In 1905, a political conflict between Norway and Sweden concerning
the abolition of their political union, led to a reduced monetary cooperation among the
Scandinavian countries.  The central banks were still accepting each other drafts but not
necessarily at par.  The three Scandinavian countries showed a common pattern of
adoption of the gold standard between 1872 and 1875 and adhered to the system until the
outbreak of the World War I in 1914 (Bergman et al., 1993;  Henriksen and Kærgard,
1995;  Jonung, 1984).
Italy, Portugal, and Spain shadowed the gold standard instead of strictly adhering to
the monetary rule.  Italy adopted a bimetallic standard in 1862, although the monetary
regime was a de facto gold standard.  Three years later, Italy became a member of the
Latin Monetary Union but war against Austria and fiscal profligacy forced Italy to abandon
convertibility.  Fiscal and monetary discipline was restored along with exchange rate parity
in 1874.  The central authorities resumed convertibility on April 12, 1884, but money was
only convertible into silver because silver was overvalued.  Italy adopted a fiduciary
standard in 1894 and remained on this system until 1914 (Fratianni and Spinelli, 1984).
Portugal operated under a bimetallic standard since the 1680s, alternating between
gold and silver.  In 1854, Portugal joined the international monetary regime and was a
member until 1891.  The Baring international crisis in conjunction with poor government
policies forced Portugal to abandon the gold standard in 1891.  Portugal suffered from a
deep political, economic, and financial crisis during the 1890s and remained inconvertible
until after World War I (Reis, 1996).
Spain shadowed the gold standard for the entire period but operated under different
monetary and fiscal regimes during the last half of the nineteenth and the beginning of the
twentieth centuries.  In 1848, Spain adopted a bimetallic standard that did not become
fully operational until a monetary reform in 1868.  During the 1870s when the gold
standard was adopted by many countries, Spain moved towards a fiduciary system with
flexible exchange rates.  Silver production increased and the price of silver in terms of
gold fell during these years.  Spain, which was then on a bimetallic system, operated under
a de facto silver standard where the intrinsic value of the coin was smaller than the face
value.  Convertibility of paper was finally suspended in 1883 and resumption never took
place before or after World War I.  However, Spain did enact fiscal and monetary reforms
in the early part of the twentieth century to reverse the fiscal problems that emerged as a
result of the Spanish-American War.
The brief monetary histories discussed above indicate that adherence to the gold
standard changed over time mainly for the Southern European countries.  In contrast, the
Scandinavian countries were always under the international monetary rule since they
adhered to the gold standard at the beginning of the 1870s until the outbreak of World War
I.  Table 1 provides a summary of the record of adherence to the gold standard.  The table
also includes events that precipitated suspension of convertibility and denotes whether
there were changes in parity.  Figure 1 shows the exchange rates for the Southern
European countries in terms of pound sterling relative to gold parity.  The Scandinavian
countries are not graphed because they never departed from parity.  The general pattern
that emerges from figures is that countries that closely adhered to the gold standard
experienced fewer fluctuations from parity.
Table 1
Adherence to the Gold Standard, 1880-1914
Country Period Standard Reason Change
For Change in Parity
Denmark 1872-1914 Gold War No
Norway 1875-1914 Gold War No
Sweden 1873-1914 Gold War No
Italy 1862-1866 Bimetallic Lax Fiscal Policy No
War
1866-1884 Paper ----- -----
1884-1894 Gold Lax fiscal Policy Yes
1894--1914 Paper ----- -----
Portugal 1854-1891 Gold Crisis Yes
1891-1914 Paper ------ ------
Spain 1868-1883 Silver Crisis Yes
1883-1914 Paper ------ ------
Source: Bordo and Kydland (1995), p. 434.
Bordo and Rockoff (1996), p. 401.
IV.  Empirical Analysis of Long-Term Interest Rates
The data employed in this study consist of a sample of annual interest rates for six
countries that followed the gold standard to varying degrees between 1880 and 1914.  Our
sample is divided into two groups.  Figure 2 plots interest rates for Denmark, Norway, and
Sweden, countries that closely followed the monetary rule, against the risk-free interest
rate, British consols.  The long-term rate used for Denmark is the interest rate on gold
bonds quoted in The Economist.  Unfortunately, long-run interest rates for Denmark are
not available until 1896.  As result, I cannot analyze the effects of the 1890s international
crisis in Denmark.  The spread between Denmark gold rates and consol yields remained
quite stable for the whole period 1896-1914.  This probably reflects the country's strict
adherence to the gold standard.
Interest rates for Norway and Denmark possessed similar trends.  In the Norwegian
case, I have to use two different long-term interest rates on gold bonds due to data
availability.  The first one was quoted until 1894.  Afterwards, a new bond series was
issued.  This explains the large decline of Norwegian interest rates in 1894.  However, as a
general rule, Norwegian interest rates are quite stable and gold bonds remained quite close
to the yield on consols for the sample period, especially after 1894 when the new interest
rates bonds were issued.  The effects of the international crisis of 1890 as well as the break
of the political union between Norway and Sweden in 1905 are practically inexistent.
Again, this possibly explains the strict adherence to the gold standard for the whole period.
Swedish interest rates for long-term government gold bonds followed the same
pattern than the other two Scandinavian bonds.  There is no change in Swedish long-term
interest rates for the entire period, even though they were not as close to yields on consols
as the Danish and Norwegians bonds.  This again reflects the country strict adherence to
the gold standard as it was the case in the other two Scandinavian countries.
Interest rates for countries that shadowed the gold standard displayed a markedly
different pattern than countries that followed the gold standard.  Rates were generally
higher for the countries that shadowed the gold standard than countries that followed the
international monetary regime.  Figure 3 is a graph of long-term interest rates for Italy,
Portugal, and Spain versus consols.  The time path of Italian interest rates is quite
interesting because of the narrow spread between gold and paper bonds.  Italian interest
rates were quite stable when the country was on the gold standard, but displayed a
surprisingly upward trend.  The upward movement in rates continued until Italy left the
international monetary regime in 1894.  Thereafter, Italy's long-term rates converged
toward the consol rate.  Overall, the Italian experience does not appear to conform well
with the hypothesis that the gold standard was a signal of financial rectitude.
Long-run interest rates for Portugal are not available until 1891.  As a result, I
cannot compare the behavior of Portuguese rates before and after the country left (1891)
the gold standard.  However, long-run interest rates for paper bonds did fall in the early
1900s as the country enacted sensible government fiscal and monetary policies, moving
closer to the gold standard.
Spanish interest rates for long-term government paper bonds followed a pattern
consistent with the "good housekeeping hypothesis."  Long-term rates initially rose at the
beginning of the sample and then fell precipitously for several years after the Treasury
minister Camacho enacted a reform in 1881.  Spanish long-term rates then display an
upward movement that culminated with the Spanish-American War.  Long-term rates were
then stable for the remainder of the period following the implementation of fiscal and
monetary reform by the Treasury minister Villaverde in the early 1900s.
As noted by Bordo and Rockoff, a prominent feature of long-term interest rates in
the gold standard period prior to World War I is convergence.  Most yields on government
securities converged towards yields on the British perpetuity bond (i.e., Scandinavian
bonds).  This probably reflects adherence to the gold standard in addition to several other
factors.  Friedman and Schwartz (1963) suggest that the fall in spreads between short-term
United States and British interest rates was a result of the fact that the free silver
movement lost popularity in the United States.  The death of the free silver movement is a
symbol of growing confidence in the international financial system and the decline in the
market price of risk (Bordo and Rockoff, p.  404).  Another factor might have been factor
price equalization that shows high mobility of labor and capital (O'Rourke and
Williamson, 1992).  Nevertheless, I believe that long-term commitment to the gold
standard was a fundamental determinant of long-term government bond yields.  Adherence
to the gold standard will be considered in the forthcoming empirical analysis.
V.  Econometric Approach
I analyze systematic risk in this sample of long-run interest rates using the
following model (see Bordo and Rockoff, 1996).
Rit - RUKt = ß0 + ßi1 (Rt* - RUKt) + εit (1)
εit =  ρi εit-1 + uit, i = 1, 2,..., 12 (2)
where Rit represents the long term interest rate for country i in the sample.  RUKt is
the risk-free interest rate measured by the consol rate in year t.  Rt* proxies for the return
on the efficient market portfolio that is given as the average of interest rates of a
representative countries' sample.1  As pointed out by Bordo and Rockoff (1996), the Rt*
variable is "far removed" from the theory (p.  405).  Nevertheless, equation (1) is a quasi-
capital asset pricing model (CAPM) where ßi1 measures systematic risk for country i.
Equation (2) is employed to capture first-order serial correlation in equation (1).  The
Cochrane-Orcutt procedure is employed to correct for the autoregressive structure in the
error process.
As discussed earlier in the paper, many countries' record of adherence to the gold
standard changed over time.  Bordo and Rockoff (1996) used equations (1) and (2) to
measure average systematic risk for each country during the years in which long-term
                                                
1 The countries included in this sample are:  Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Italy,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kigdom, and United States.
interest rates are available.  I reconsider their model by recursively estimating the beta
coefficient for each country.  This methodology has several advantages over their least
squares approach corrected for serial correlation.  First, Bordo and Rockoff employ a
dummy variable to capture the effect of being on the gold standard.  A dummy variable is
and on-off variable that cannot capture the impact of policy changes for countries that
shadowed the gold standard.  At the other extreme, a dummy variable is not useful for
countries that always adhered to the gold standard because the variable will always take a
value of one.
Therefore, I believe that a recursive analysis can provide further insight into the
relationship between adherence and risk premia in long-term government securities.
Specifically, I can use the recursive analysis to address questions such as the relationship
between shadowing and risk premia, the behavior of risk during periods of crises, and
whether forward looking expectations appear to have influenced systematic risk in long-
term interest rates.  The only disadvantage of this approach is that it estimates univariate
regressions.  To the extent that innovations in interest rates are correlated across countries
then there is a loss of efficiency in this approach.  In summary, I believe that this
methodology is one approach that can yield additional insights into the behavior of interest
rates during the gold standard period.
I employ the Kalman filter methodology to examine time-varying systematic risk in
long-term interest rates during the gold standard period.  The Kalman filter is a simple
algorithm that sequentially processes observations allowing the beta coefficients to evolve
over time.  Estimation of the Kalman filter requires the specification of an observation and
state equation.  The observation equation for country i is
Rit - RUKt = Xit ßit + eit (3)
where ηit is the variance of eit.  The only difference between equation (1) and
equation (3) is that ßit in equation (3) is a vector that contains the constant and the beta
coefficient that evolves over time.  The estimates in the last period of the Kalman filter,
referred to as the final state vector, are equivalent to the least squares estimates.  As noted
above, a second equation is needed to estimate the Kalman filter.  The second equation,
commonly referred to as the state equation, describes the evolution of the beta coefficients
over time.  I assume that the state equation for country i evolves as a random walk that can
be written as follows
ßit = ßit-1 + vit (4)
where Mit is the variance of vit.  The Kalman filter is then initialized with starting
values taken from the first two periods for each equation.  Maximum Likelihood
techniques are then employed to provide annual estimates of systematic risk.  The beta
coefficients for gold bonds are reported in Table 2.  The beta coefficients for paper bonds
appear in Table 3.  There is only one set of estimates for risk reported since the results
from both the least squares model corrected for serial correlation and the estimates from
the final state vector of the Kalman filter are identical.1  Figures 4-10 plot the beta
coefficient for each country as it evolves over time.
Table 2
Least Squares Estimates for Gold Bonds
Constant Coefficient Rho DW R2-adjuste N
                                                
1 I estimated the Kalman filter using the time series corrected for serial correlation.
Denmark
Norway
Sweden
Italy
0.079
(0.145)
0.259
(0.275)
0.916***
(0.212)
-0.256
(0.529)
0.315***
(0.106)
0.315*
(0.174)
0.155
(0.131)
0.609***
(0.172)
0.368
(0.266)
0.478***
(0.157)
0.732***
(0.131)
0.949***
(0.064)
1.589
2.117
1.951
1.966
0.507
0.318
0.552
0.939
18
31
33
34
Note: * means significant at the 10 percent level.
** means significant at the 5 percent level.
*** means significant at the 1 percent level.
Table 3
Least Squares Estimates for Paper Bonds
Constant Coefficient Rho DW R2- N
adjusted
Italy 0.109
(0.539)
0.529**
(0.228)
0.927***
(0.085)
2.111 0.886 34
Portugal -0.024
(0.289)
1.782***
(0.183)
1.307 0.802 24
Spain -1.984**
(0.794)
2.671***
(0.485)
0.796***
(0.106)
1.875 0.901 31
Note: * means significant at the 10 percent level.
** means significant at the 5 percent level.
*** means significant at the 1 percent level.
VI.  Variability of Systematic Risk during the Gold Standard Period
The results from the econometric analysis support the hypothesis that the gold
standard was a signal of financial rectitude, "a good housekeeping seal of approval."  I find
that for Italian gold bonds, the beta coefficient that measures risk is significant at the one
percent level.  However, they are significant at different levels for the Scandinavian
countries, being Denmark significant at the one percent while Norway is at the ten percent
level.  Moreover, the results indicate that countries that closely adhered to the gold standard
have lower beta coefficients.  The empirical evidence for the paper bonds confirms the
findings for the gold bonds.  The beta coefficients for the Southern European countries are
significant at the one per cent level, and all are greater than one except for Italy.  The large
beta coefficients for the paper bonds reflect then currency risk.  I now examine the time-
varying risk component for the gold and paper bonds to provide a more in depth look into
the relationship between adherence to the monetary rule and systematic risk.  I examine risk
during crisis periods and check the results for any unusual pattern in risk or perceived risk.
The empirical evidence for Denmark, Norway, and Sweden shows that risk
fluctuated within a narrow range.  In addition, there is a convergence of systematic risk in
the Scandinavian monetary union.  The Scandinavian countries are characterized as
countries that adhered to the gold standard.  As a result, I would expect the beta coefficients
to be small and to exhibit not much variability.  An inspection of the beta coefficients
plotted in Figures 4, 5, and 6 shows that they fluctuated between –0.4 and 0.4 in the three
countries.  The low values of the recursive estimates for Denmark, Norway, and Sweden are
a signal of the closed adherence to the gold standard of these three countries.
Data constraints prohibit an analysis of risk for Denmark prior to 1896 (Figure 4).
Systematic risk showed a decline in 1898 that is followed by a sharp rise a year later.  This
movement in systematic risk is difficult to explain, but risk fluctuated within a narrow
range (-0.4 and 0.3).  This might reflect the onset of the banking agreement between the
Scandinavian central banks that formally took place in 1901.  After this point, the beta
coefficient for the interest rates time series is remarkably stable for Denmark until the
beginning of World War I.  The absence of fluctuations in risk during this last period also
indicates that the country was on the gold standard.
Systematic risk in long-term Norwegian debt was quite volatile during the 1880s
(Figure 5).  The international crisis of 1873 and the decrease in railway investments, due to
variations in customs, affected Norway in 1879.  The government’s finances then suffered a
crisis that could be reflected in the fluctuations of the beta coefficient in the years just after
the panic occurred.  Risk reached almost its previous value but the liquidity panic, and
therefore the perceived financial risk of the last years of the 1890s made it fall.  It did not
stabilize until the agreement between the Bank of Denmark and the Bank of Norway was
signed in 1901.  Thereafter, systematic risk for Norway remained very stable until 1914,
reflecting the fact that the country was on the gold standard.
Sweden is the last remaining country examined in the group of the Scandinavian
countries (Figure 6).  The beta coefficient for Sweden has the smallest value of the
countries in the sample.  Risk in Swedish securities follows a path similar to that of Norway
just at the beginning of the sample.  Risk in long-term government securities fluctuated a
lot at the beginning of the 1880s.  This probably reflects, in part, the deflation suffered by
the country at that time.  The rapid expansion of industrialization and growth reflect the
upward trend in systematic risk that stabilized after 1901.  The absence of a rise in risk
during the whole period, except for the movements of the 1880s, also indicates that Sweden
was a member country of the gold standard.
In contrast, the beta coefficients for the countries that shadowed the gold standard,
Italy, Portugal, and Spain, are all higher than one (one is the beta coefficient for the market
portfolio), except for Italian bonds.  This means that countries that shadowed the gold
standard were charged higher interest rates in international capital markets because of their
higher risk.  The estimates for Italy, Portugal, and Spain also have a greater range that is to
be expected given that the three European countries exhibited a wide range of positions
towards the gold standard during the period 1880 to 1914.
The recursive estimates for Italy indicate that systematic risk fell in the 1880s
(Figures 7 and 8).  The country enacted conservative fiscal and monetary reforms and
moved towards the gold standard during the 1870s.  These facts are reflected in the
downward trend followed by systematic risk in the 1880s.  However, after this point, the
beta coefficients for both interest rate series start taking an upward trend and they did not
really stabilize until the beginning of the twentieth century.  The gold issue does take on a
noticeable upward trend beginning in 1889.  Nevertheless, Italian government securities
seem to be largely immune to the international crisis of 1891.  The empirical result might
suggest that Italy pursued a time invariant policy of shadowing the gold standard.
Unfortunately, this interpretation does not fit well with Italy's historical record of adherence
to the gold standard.  Italy left the gold standard in 1894 and did not exhibit monetary and
fiscal restraint until after 1901.  Perhaps other forces such as factor price equalization or
changes in government policy can explain the unusual behavior of the beta coefficient for
the Southern European country.  In any case, I leave this as an item for future research.
On the other hand, the time path of systematic risk for Portugal follows a pattern
consistent with the predictions of the "good housekeeping seal of approval" (Figure 9).
Data constraints prohibit an analysis of risk prior to Portugal's departure from the gold
standard in 1891.  Nevertheless, the beta coefficient for Portugal has its highest values
between 2.8 and 3 times the market beta, at the beginning of the sample.  This suggests that
systematic risk was quite high during the international crisis of 1891.  The beta coefficient
then follows a cyclical pattern during the 1890s as Portugal recovered from the Baring
crisis.  Beginning in 1904, the beta coefficient is constant for the remainder of the sample
that could reflect fiscal restraint and a movement by Portugal towards the gold standard.
Systematic risk in long-term Spanish debt trading on the London Exchange also fits
nicely with the hypothesis that the gold standard was a signal of financial rectitude (Figure
10).  In 1881, the Treasury minister Camacho restructured government securities through a
debt conversion.  The fundamental characteristic of the reform was that investors received
interest payments in London or Paris in pound sterling or French francs, respectively.  The
beta coefficient for Spain decreased from approximately 4 to 1.5 in the years surrounding
the implementation of the Camacho Reform in 1881.  The time path of systematic risk
during this period suggests that government policy was a credible move towards the gold
standard (although not a formal commitment).  The results also suggest that Spain probably
shadowed the gold standard at an earlier date than previous studies have suggested (see
García-Iglesias, 1998).  The beta coefficient decreased for a few years after the fiscal reform
of 1881 and then rose during the 1890s following the international crisis of 1891 and the
Cuban War of 1898.  The large expense of the war and the loss of the overseas colonies
ultimately led to the passage of the Villaverde reform that restored budget equilibrium in
Spain.  This is reflected in the remarkably constant beta coefficient in long-term Spanish
debt at the beginning of the twentieth century.  Although there is little volatility in the beta
coefficient in the years leading to World War I, systematic risk in Spain was higher during
the first decade of the 1900s than during the years that followed the Camacho reform.
VII.  Conclusion
Several conclusions emerge from this study of time-varying systematic risk for the
sample of six countries that adhered to the gold standard with varying degrees.  Although
there are some exceptions, like Italy, the results confirm the findings of Bordo and
Rockoff.  The gold standard was a signal of financial rectitude, "a good housekeeping seal
of approval" where countries that followed the rule were charged lower interest rates and
given greater access to international capital markets.  However, the results from this paper
tell a much richer story about systematic risk and adherence to the gold standard.  I find
that risk fell markedly following the adoption of time-consistent monetary and fiscal
policies (i.e., Spain).  I also find that risk increases considerably more during crisis periods
for countries that did not closely adhere to the gold standard.  This result suggests that
there was a 'flight to quality' during the international crisis of 1890 where world investors
traded in their emerging market debt for US corporate debt and British consols.  Moreover,
risk remained high for many years in several peripheral countries following international
crisis, or perceived financial crisis.  This suggests that it is beneficial for a small country to
adhere to a monetary rule.  A country can benefit from participating in a monetary union as
opposed to a country that pursues independent monetary policies.  Strict adherence then
allows a country to borrow at lower interest rates in international capital markets.
These findings also indicate systematic risk stabilized for almost all the countries in
the sample during the 1900s.  This could be the result of a fall in the overall market price
risk, a 'market wide' effect of the gold standard.  At the same time, the convergence of
systematic risk for the Scandinavian countries might suggest that also a considerable
amount of time is needed for monetary variables to converge when in a monetary union.
This evidence from the study of the gold standard might be helpful to the monetary
authorities of the European Union.
Therefore, the Scandinavian countries by joining the Scandinavian Currency Union
and the classical gold standard enjoyed the benefits of a predetermined monetary regime.
On the other hand, the Southern European countries, even though they shadowed the gold
standard, followed an independent monetary policy that did not allow them to accrue
similar benefits.  These results can contribute to the development of the Europe of
tomorrow.  Monetary authorities can learn from history by anticipating the venues of the
changing face of Europe.
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